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Abstract: 
 
Although the literature about aid effectiveness is huge, most of it is based on cross-
country studies and not address the Mediterranean countries as an especial group. To fill 
in this gap, the paper describes the main structural characteristics of ODA. ODA is 
analysed by country, by donor, and by sector for 1960-2007 in ten Mediterranean 
countries. Different patterns among recipient countries are found, but a proliferation and 
concentration of donors is confirmed. A positive correlation between shocks in GDP 
and ODA is found when the whole sample countries is analyzed, but when the 
Mediterranean economies are individually considered the pro-cyclicality of the ODA is 
not confirmed, except in the case of Lebanon. FDI, remittances and ODA flows are 
compared. The three variables are positively correlated. ODA and remittances are 
indeed less volatile than FDI flows. But whereas remittances are stable and strategic to 
Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey, ODA flows to Syria and the Palestinian territories are 
higher than remittances in volume but more volatile. Egypt and Turkey are the main 
destinations of FDI to the region. Finally, it is shown that ODA does not offset the 
shocks of FDI or remittances. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
Although literature about Official Development Assistance (ODA) at macro level is 
huge, especially in relation to aid effectiveness, most of the studies are performed under 
cross-country scenarios and dealing with as big sample data as possible. These 
approaches are valid for some general aspects but they tend to forget the heterogeneity 
inside developing countries. In particular, the literature about ODA flows to the 
Mediterranean countries is quite scarce and, as to my knowledge, no other previous 
work has made an analysis of the relationship among ODA to the Mediterranean 
countries and their GDP, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances flows. This 
paper tries to fill this gap focusing on the shocks of these variables. 
Maybe the closer study to this paper objective is Teboul & Moustier (2001). They test 
aid effectiveness on growth for the south Mediterranean countries from 1960 to 1996, 
and they conclude that aid has been effective on growth but only in an indirect way (via 
savings and FDI) and that aid should be more regular, because it is often chaotic and 
caused by geopolitical interests. On the other hand, Abou (2008) find a positive 
relationship between aid and growth in Jordan but not in Egypt. Both variables, 
measured in per capita terms, are cointegrated in Jordan for 1965-2005 and the Granger 
causality test showed an effect from aid to GDP. Finally, Neumayer (2003) supports the 
importance of being Arab for receiving aid from Arab countries and multilateral 
agencies.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a picture of the growth, poverty and 
inequality in ten selected Mediterranean countries is drawn. In section 3, we study if 
ODA is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical to GDP. Section 4 analyzes the volatility of 
three external financial sources: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), remittances and 
ODA. Section 5 answers the question if aid offset shocks in FDI and remittances. 
Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions and findings. 
2. GROWTH, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES. 
 
The goal of this section is just to have an introductory picture of the developmental path 
of the Mediterranean countries that we are to analyse. The study is organized comparing 
four regions (the whole world, MENA geographic region, and Lower and Upper Middle 
Income Countries) with ten Mediterranean countries. Five countries belong to North 
Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt), and five countries are placed on 
the Middle East (Israel, the Palestinian Administered Territories, Lebanon, Syria and 
Turkey). 
Economic growth, poverty and inequality are macroeconomic dimensions that have to 
be jointly analyzed. Recent literature has insisted on this (Bourguignon 2004; Cornia 
2004; Goudie & Ladd 1999; Iradian 2005; Kanbur 2004; López & Servén 2006; 
Ravallion 2001; Larrú 2006), either theoretically or empirically. But none of them have 
focused on the Mediterranean region. 
 
The Mediterranean countries have followed different growth patterns and intensities, as 
it can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Growth rates in the South-Mediterranean countries. 1961-2005. 
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GDP growth
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt, Arab Rep. Libya  
 
Middle East region 
GDP growth
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Israel Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic West Bank and Gaza Turkey  
Source: Author based on WDI data. 
 
Widely speaking, in the sixties and seventies the North Africa region experienced high  
but volatile growth rates, whilst both rates were lower among 1980-2005. The 
Mediterranean Middle East countries have performed a more stable pattern, being Syria 
an exception. 
A detailed analysis can be done bearing in mind the descriptive statistics contained in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the growth rates. 1961-2005. 
 est dev mean median CV max min 
Lower middle income 2,21 5,38 5,70 0,41 9,61 -1,63
Middle East & North Africa 3,64 4,59 3,82 0,79 14,90 -1,64
World 1,53 3,65 3,69 0,42 6,68 0,21
Upper middle income* 2,19 2,88 3,13 0,76 6,92 -0,97
West Bank and Gaza** 8,99 2,78 6,11 3,23 12,65 -14,79
Turkey* 4,26 4,34 5,57 0,98 10,46 -7,49
Syrian Arab Republic 8,35 5,71 5,18 1,46 25,03 -8,96
Israel 3,95 5,52 5,17 0,72 16,24 -1,20
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,02 5,29 4,97 0,57 14,63 0,63
Tunisia 3,53 5,19 4,91 0,68 17,74 -1,45
Libya*** 15,23 6,97 4,52 2,18 45,07 -18,80
Lebanon 15,62 4,68 4,48 3,34 38,20 -42,45
Algeria 8,35 3,98 4,40 2,10 34,31 -19,69
Morocco 4,62 4,15 4,34 1,11 12,52 -6,58
Notes: region and countries are ranked by the median growth rate.* stands for 1969-2005 data period; **  
1995-2005; *** 1988-99’s data for Libya are missing.  
Source: Author based on WDI data. 
 
Excluding the Palestinian territories, all the sample countries have performed a higher 
growth rate than the world’s average. There are dramatic stagnations (Lebanon 1989, 
Algeria 1962, Libya 1981) and amazing accelerations (Libya 1964, Lebanon 1991 or 
Algeria 1963). The exact values can be seen in the last columns of the Table 1. 
Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Syria have experienced considerable number of years with 
negative growth rates (20% or more) (Table 2). In contrast, Egypt has never had 
negative growth rates. 
 
Table 2. Years with negative growth rates. 1961-2005. 
 Years with negative growth rate Years with data % 
Middle East & North Africa 4 40 10,0% 
Upper middle income 3 37 8,1% 
Lower middle income 1 45 2,2% 
World 0 45 0,0% 
Libya 10 33 30,3% 
West Bank and Gaza 3 11 27,3% 
Morocco 10 45 22,2% 
Algeria 9 45 20,0% 
Syrian Arab Republic 9 45 20,0% 
Turkey 5 37 13,5% 
Lebanon 2 17 11,8% 
Israel 4 45 8,9% 
Tunisia 3 44 6,8% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 45 0,0% 
Note: countries are ranked by percentage of years with negative growth rates.  
Source: Author based on WDI data. 
 
Growth rates are associated with poverty measures. Selecting a poverty line of 2 dollars 
a day, measured in constant USD 2005 and in PPP terms, we build the evolution of the 
headcount poverty measure for the five countries whose data are available (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of population with income under 2USD 2005, PPP per day. 
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Source: Author based on World Bank’s Povcalnet database. 
Egypt, as the country with the best performance in terms of economic growth, shows 
the best performance in terms of poverty reduction (Table 3). She reduces the headcount 
poverty measure by 23.76% for 1981-2005, and by 14.6% in the eighties.  
 
Table 3. Evolution of poverty headcount index. 
country 1981-1990 1990-1999 1999-2005 1981-2005 
Egypt 14,60 8,30 0,86 23,76 
Tunisia 7,83 5,65 5,91 19,39 
Morocco 16,57 -8,42 8,18 16,33 
Turkey 10,56 -0,16 -1,11 9,29 
Algeria -7,2 -3,58 8,21 -2,57 
Note: Countries are ranked by difference for 1981-2005 period. 
Source: Author based on World Bank’s Povcalnet database. 
 
A stable pattern of poverty reduction can be detected in Tunisia, who ranks second, with 
near 20% of poverty reduction for 1981-2005 period. Tunisia ranked third in 1981 with 
a headcount rate of 26.35%. In 2005, she had the lowest poverty level (6.96%). 
Morocco is the third country in the ranking. She decreased the poverty index by 16.3% 
although poverty rose during the 90’s. Almost all the success in poverty reduction was 
happened in the ‘80s. 
The same applies to Turkey. She reduced poverty in the ‘80s, but rise slightly in the 
‘90s (1987-93) and the beginning of XXI century (1996-2002). The country 
performance for last three years (2002-05) was well, with a decrease of 0.45%. 
Algeria is a failed case in terms of poverty reduction. Poverty rose in the ‘80s (7.2%) 
and the ‘90s (3.6%), showing a maximum in 1999, with a quarter of her population 
under de poverty line. Poverty fall by 8.2% over last years but, in 2005, she still had a 
2.57% higher poverty than in 1981. 
 
Figure 3. Gini index in 2005. 
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Source: Author based on World Bank’s Povcalnet database. 
 
We have seen the economic growth and poverty rates. Inequality is the third dimension 
closely related to these rates. Figure 3 shows Gini index for the five countries in the last 
year that data are available. 
Inequality tends to be stable in the short run. We can check it in the sample’s countries. 
The differences between Gini indexes in 1981 and 2005 are -4,81 in Algeria, -2.62 in 
Tunisia, -0.34 in Turkey. Inequality rose in Egypt (+0.14) and Morocco (+1.61). 
 
Finally, we compare Gross National Income per capita in 2007. 
 
Figure 4. GNI per capita, PPP (current international $). 
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Source: Author based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators database on line. 
 
Table 4. GNI per capita, PPP (current international $). 
Country Name 2007 Index Country group 
Upper middle income 11.867  
World 9.852  
Middle East & North Africa 7.384  
Lower middle income 4.542  
Israel 25.930 100,0 High Income non-OECD 
Libya 14.710 56,7 UMIC 
Turkey 12.350 47,6 UMIC 
Lebanon 10.050 38,8 UMIC 
Algeria 7.640 29,5 LMIC 
Tunisia 7.130 27,5 LMIC 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.400 20,8 LMIC 
Syrian Arab Republic 4.370 16,9 LMIC 
Morocco 3.990 15,4 LMIC 
West Bank and Gaza n.a. LMIC 
Source: Author based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators database on line. 
 
The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) accounts for 19 countries, basically 
the Mediterranean plus Arab Persian Gulf countries. The Lower Middle Income 
Countries (LMICs) accounts for 58 countries and they are those in which 2005 GNI per 
capita was between $876 and $3,465. Six out of ten selected Mediterranean countries 
are included in this category. The Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs) accounts 
for 40 countries and are those in which 2005 GNI per capita was between $3,466 and 
$10,725. 
GNI per capita of Israel (almost 26.000 international $) doubled the following country 
(Libya) and is 6.5 times the lowest (Morocco). The first five countries have more GNI 
per capita than the MENA average (7.384$) and Israel, Libya, Turkey and Lebanon 
exceed the world average income per capita. 
 
Bearing in mind these figures, groups and differences among the ten countries selected 
for the analysis, we explore the relationship of their ODA flows to GDP, FDI and 
remittances in the next sections. 
 
3. IS ODA PRO-CYCLICAL OR COUNTER-CYCLICAL TO GDP? 
 
Most recent literature (Gemmel & McGillivray 1998; Pallage and Robe 2001; Bulir & 
Hamman 2003; Borensztein et al. 2008; Frot & Santiso 2008) maintains a pro-cyclical 
relation among aid recipient countries. Aid follows the recipients’ business cycles rather 
than being counter-cyclical. The effect is clearer among more aid dependent countries 
(Agenor & Aizenman 2007). To check this hypothesis on our Mediterranean sample, we 
follow the Borensztein’s methodology. The authors compute the correlation between aid 
and income shocks. These consists in calculating the 5 year moving average of the time 
series, both the GDP and the ODA flows, and regress the transformed variables. The 
results obtained can be seen in the Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Correlations between ODA and GDP. 5-year moving averages 
Region/country correlation coef R2 Observations Period with data available 
World 0,98 0,96 42 1960-2005 
LMICs 0,94 0,89 42 1960-2005 
UMICs 0,91 0,84 42 1968-2005 
MENA 0,83 0,68 42 1960-2005 
Lebanon 0,96 0,92 42 1988-2005 
Morocco 0,73 0,54 42 1960-2005 
Tunisia 0,62 0,38 42 1960-2005 
Israel 0,50 0,25 41 1960-2004 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0,44 0,19 42 1960-2005 
Libya -0,43 0,18 42 1960-87 & 1990-2005 
West Bank and Gaza 0,42 0,17 13 1994-2005 
Syrian Arab Republic 0,35 0,12 42 1960-2005 
Algeria 0,33 0,11 42 1960-2005 
Turkey 0,13 0,02 42 1968-2005 
Note: Countries and regions are ranked by the R2 value. 
Source: Author calculation based on WDI data. 
 
The first column differentiates three regions –Low and Upper Middle Income Countries 
and Mead East and North African countries- including the world data to the sample’s 
Mediterranean countries considered individually. In the second column, the correlation 
coefficients are offered. The third column contains the R2 coefficient. The region and 
country list is ranked under these values.  
As expected by the literature, ODA is pro-cyclical when the whole world is considered. 
The positive and strong correlation is maintained in the middle income countries values, 
although it is minor when the MENA region is considered. 
But, interestingly, the only country that maintains this pro-cyclicality is Lebanon 
under the period 1988-2005 (when data for GDP are available). The case of Lebanon 
is clearer viewed in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. ODA and GDP in Lebanon: annual levels and 5 years moving averages. 
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Lebanon 5 years moving averages
0
5.000
10.000
15.000
20.000
25.000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
G
D
P 
cu
rr
en
t U
SD
 (m
ill
)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
O
D
A
 c
ur
re
nt
 U
SD
 (m
ill
)
GDP ODA  
Source: Author calculation based on WDI’s data. 
 
The relationship between ODA and GDP’s moving averages is NOT pro-cyclical for the 
rest of the countries of the Mediterranean sample. The R2 ranks from 0.54 in the case of 
Morocco to 0.02 for Turkey. The signs of the correlation coefficients are always 
positive except on the Libya’s case. Her negative sign shows a potential counter-
cyclical effect. Libya could be an outlier but we have to analyze the result quite 
carefully due to the GDP’s missing values for 1988-89.  
 
Figure 6. Correlation between ODA and GDP in Libya. 
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Source: Author calculation based on WDI data.  
 
All in all, when we consider wide cross-country samples or all the recipient countries, a 
positive correlation between GDP and ODA is found. But when we consider the 
Mediterranean economies individually the pro-cyclicality of the ODA is not confirmed, 
except in the case of Lebanon. 
 
Table 6. Number of windfalls and shortfalls episodes. Current USD. 
# 5 years moving 
average RATIOS 
GDP windfalls GDP shortfalls 
 >5% >10% >20% >30% <-5% <-10% <-20% <-30% 
MENA 29 13 4 1 0 0 0 0
LMICs 30 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
UMICs 19 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
World 32 13 0 0 0 0 0 0
Algeria 25 15 7 1 4 0 0 0
Morocco 27 13 0 0 1 0 0 0
Tunisia 26 12 2 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey 19 13 3 0 1 0 0 0
Egypt 31 13 0 0 0 0 0 0
Libya 22 19 10 5 3 0 0 0
Israel 34 18 1 0 0 0 0 0
Lebanon 10 7 5 0 0 0 0 0
Syria 28 16 3 0 4 1 0 0
West Bank and Gaza 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 ODA windfalls ODA shortfalls 
 >5% >10% >20% >30% <-5% <-10% <-20% <-30% 
MENA 19 14 8 6 11 6 0 0
LMICs 23 13 5 0 0 0 0 0
UMICs 21 10 6 2 4 1 0 0
World 24 12 1 0 0 0 0 0
Algeria 13 8 0 0 10 6 2 0
Morocco 17 12 7 4 7 5 0 0
Tunisia 24 14 2 0 9 5 2 0
Turkey 13 11 9 6 17 14 5 2
Egypt 15 12 9 6 17 11 2 1
Libya 16 12 5 2 17 11 7 3
Israel 16 11 7 6 14 9 2 2
Lebanon 21 16 9 9 10 7 4 3
Syria 14 14 12 11 21 17 6 5
West Bank and Gaza 11 7 2 2 0 0 0 0
Total GPD 10-
countries 224 126 31 6 13 1 0 0
Total ODA 10-
countries 160 117 62 46 122 85 30 16
Source: Author calculation based on WDI data. 
 
Table 6 offers the number of windfall and shortfall episodes in the 5 year-moving 
averages series. Windfalls have been more abundant in GDP than in ODA, but ODA 
windfalls have been more outstanding. There have been 46 windfalls in ODA higher 
than 30% and 62 higher than 20%, whilst windfalls in GDP have been only 6 and 31 
respectively. Shortfalls have been more abundant in ODA flows. Syria is the country 
with more remarkable shortfalls episodes in ODA, computing 5 out of 16 episodes with 
-30% values. Turkey, Egypt and Libya have experienced 17 shortfall episodes higher 
than 5%. Algeria and Syria experienced 4 shortfall episodes in GDP higher than 5%. 
In contrast, Libya is the Mediterranean country with more windfalls in GDP. She has 
had 5 episodes with windfalls higher than 30%. 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis. 
 
The above results have been obtained using current dollars. This implies that we could 
mislead the relationship due not to taking into account exchange rate volatilities. To 
remedying this fact we compute alternative analysis in constant dollars. We take 
constant 2006 US dollars for ODA figures from OECD-DAC data. We calculate 
deflactors for each country and year and apply them to current GDP values, getting the 
cross-country constant GDP figures. We de-trend constant ODA and GDP time series 
applying four techniques. Firstly we obtained 5-years average time series as we did 
above. Secondly, following Hudson & Mosley (2008), we normalized the series, 
dividing each one by their mean and multiplying by 100. This transformation allows us 
getting the whole series under the same mean (100) and analyzing their variance in a 
clearer way. Thirdly, we applied natural logs to constant values to mitigate their 
different scales and compare proportional changes. Fourthly, we apply Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (with λ=100 as we are working with annual values), following Bulir & Hamann 
(2003, 2008). 
The results are offered in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Correlations between GDP and ODA. Constant 2006 USD. 
5 years-aveg 0,33 0,44 0,5 0,96 -0,43 0,73 0,42 0,35 0,62 0,13
current 0,11 0,19 0,25 0,92 0,18 0,54 0,17 0,12 0,38 0,02
constant Algeria Egypt Israel Lebanon Libya Morocco 
Palestinian 
Adm. 
Areas 
Syria Tunisia Turkey 
correlac -0,55 -0,16 0,42 0,48 -0,59 0,26 -0,39 0,47 -0,54 -0,32LEVELS 
R2 0,3001 0,0258 0,1760 0,2351 0,3461 0,0662 0,1548 0,2228 0,2878 0,1009
correlac -0,62 -0,28 0,37 0,48 -0,30 0,18 -0,39 0,44 -0,54 -0,32NORMALIZED 
R2 0,3001 0,0258 0,1760 0,2351 0,3461 0,0662 0,1548 0,2228 0,2878 0,1009
correlac -0,77 -0,01 0,49 0,52 -0,27 0,36 -0,34 0,47 -0,44 -0,50LOG_levels 
R2 0,6547 0,0082 0,2580 0,2746 0,4594 0,1978 0,1166 0,2438 0,1944 0,2522
correlac -0,62 -0,17 0,52 0,88 -0,58 0,26 0,13 0,62 -0,63 -0,65
5 years-aveg R2 0,3815 0,0294 0,2705 0,7670 0,3307 0,0670 0,0161 0,3829 0,3999 0,4198
correlac -0,71 -0,11 0,61 0,77 -0,86 0,31 -0,13 0,57 -0,72 -0,80HP filter 
R2 0,4987 0,0120 0,3691 0,5891 0,7334 0,0990 0,0179 0,3238 0,5246 0,6383
Notes: Highest R2 coefficient for each country in italics.  
Source: Author calculation based on OECD-DAC and WDI data. 
 
The main differences to results in current dollars (first two raws) are the following. In 
six out of ten cases the R2 is higher. Correlation coefficients of Algeria and Egypt 
change their sign turning negative. In Algeria, her R2 rose remarkably under Log values 
whereas in Egypt is still near cero. Israel maintains her signs ad values near to the 
computation in current dollars. Lebanon maintains her signs and it is still the highest 
R2.except under the Hodrick-Prescott’s filter. Libya, ranks the highest determination 
coefficient after de-trended the data with the filter, and her correlation rose outstanding 
(-0.86). Morocco is the case where the constant dollars results, fell more remarkably 
compared to current dollars. In constant dollars, no significant correlation appears. 
Results are even weaker in constant dollars in the Palestinian case. But in the Syrian 
case, her results are now higher, both in correlation and R2 coefficients. Tunisia and 
Turkey also change the sense of the correlation, turning negative, but their R2 
coefficients are around 0.5 and 0.6 respectively. 
 
If we select the Hodrick-Prescott filter as the benchmark results, as they show on 
average (0.38) the highest determination coefficients, we obtain the following rank 
(Table 8). 
Table 8. Ranking of correlations between GDP and ODA. HP filter method, in constant USD. 
 correlations R2 
Libya -0,86 0,7334
Turkey -0,80 0,6383
Lebanon 0,77 0,5891
Tunisia -0,72 0,5246
Algeria -0,71 0,4987
Israel 0,61 0,3691
Syria 0,57 0,3238
Morocco 0,31 0,0990
Palestinian Adm. Areas -0,13 0,0179
Egypt -0,11 0,0120
Source: Author calculation based on OECD-DAC and WDI data. 
 
So, our main result still remains after the sensitivity analysis. Only Lebanon shows a 
statistically strong pro-cyclical association between ODA and GDP. The negative 
correlation in the Libyan case still remains. R2 coefficient has risen a bit (0.18 to 0.33 in 
constant levels and 0.73 under the HP filter method). In four cases, the sign of the 
correlation coefficient has turned negative, but they have low values in their R-squared 
figures. 
 
If we compute the number of shocks in both, ODA and GDP, variables under a variety 
of levels, we obtain the results showed in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Shocks in ODA and GDP. Constant 2006 USD. 
 positive shocks negative shocks 
 >105 >110 >120 <95 <90 <80 
ODA 
Algeria 10 8 5 18 16 12
Egypt 13 11 9 25 20 13
Israel 14 13 10 16 12 9
Lebanon 21 18 15 20 18 12
   
Libya 12 9 6 22 19 13
Morocco 18 14 11 19 16 9
Palestinian 
Adm. Areas 
9 9 7 4 1 0
Syria 16 13 13 23 22 18
Tunisia 17 13 5 16 13 7
Turkey 13 13 12 23 21 16
SUM 143 121 93 186 158 109
GDP 
Algeria 30 26 14 10 8 4
Egypt 26 20 7 9 5 1
Israel 24 14 4 6 5 4
Lebanon 12 10 8 2 1 0
Libya 20 16 8 12 11 9
Morocco 29 14 1 3 1 0
Palestinian 
Adm. Areas 
5 4 1 5 3 1
Syria 29 21 11 6 6 5
Tunisia 30 18 4 4 3 0
Turkey 19 18 13 16 12 3
SUM 224 161 71 73 55 27
GDP minus ODA 
Algeria 20 18 9 -8 -8 -8
Egypt 13 9 -2 -16 -15 -12
Israel 10 1 -6 -10 -7 -5
Lebanon -9 -8 -7 -18 -17 -12
Libya 8 7 2 -10 -8 -4
Morocco 11 0 -10 -16 -15 -9
Palestinian 
Adm. Areas 
-4 -5 -6 1 2 1
Syria 13 8 -2 -17 -16 -13
Tunisia 13 5 -1 -12 -10 -7
Turkey 6 5 1 -7 -9 -13
Note: A negative sign in the last panel means higher shocks in ODA than in GDP. 
 Source: Author calculation based on OECD-DAC and WDI data. 
 
During last decades, there have been more negative than positive shocks in ODA to the 
Mediterranean countries. Conversely, there have been more positive than negative 
shocks in their GDP. On average, there have been more negative shocks in ODA than in 
GDP. Positive shocks in GDP are more abundant in all Mediterranean countries, except 
in Lebanon and Palestine. Morocco has had smaller positive shocks in ODA. Algeria is 
unique having low positive shocks in GDP. 
 
4. THE VOLATILITY OF FDI, REMITTANCES AND ODA. 
 
In this section, we compare the time trend of ODA flows to other two external sources 
to finance the economic growth: FDI and remittances. Firstly, a time trends analysis of 
the flows are offered and, secondly, a comparison to ODA’s volatility is made. 
 
The evolution of FDI flows. 
During 1970-2005, eight Mediterranean countries received FDI net inflows (no data for 
Libya and West Bank and Gaza are available on WDI database). Israel, Turkey, Egypt 
and Lebanon have been the main recipient countries whilst FDI to Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco and Syria have been less significant. The evolution of the time series can be 
seen in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. FDI flows to North Africa and Middle East Mediterranean countries. 
FDI inflows
-1.000
0
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
cu
rr
en
t U
SD
 (m
ill
)
Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt  
FDI inflows
-2.000
0
2.000
4.000
6.000
8.000
10.000
12.000
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
cu
rr
en
t U
SD
 (m
ill
)
Israel Lebanon Syria Turkey  
 
Source: Author based on WDI data.  
 
We calculate a measure of volatility for FDI flows and compare the world, region and 
country values. We select the coefficient of variation as maybe the simplest measure of 
volatility (that is, a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability distribution, given 
by the coefficient of the standard deviation and the mean). This gives us an idea of how 
each financial flow has moved around its mean. As CV is a dimensionless number we 
may compare data sets with different units or wildly different means as in our case. 
As in Table 10 can be seen, FDI is highly volatile in the Mediterranean economies. Six 
countries out of eight have higher FDI volatility than the world value and the Lower 
Income Countries group1. All the sample’s countries except Tunisia, are also more 
volatile than the MENA group. 
 
Table 10. FDI volatility. 1970-2005. 
 est dev mean median cv 
World 369.931,41 290.245,82 143.702,89 1,27 
UMICs 30.751,64 24.831,15 6.212,68 1,24 
LMICs 42.389,97 35.685,98 9.602,42 1,19 
MENA 2.686,93 2.353,25 1.445,58 1,14 
Morocco 466,19 222,04 59,08 2,10 
Turkey 1.715,26 829,44 239,50 2,07 
Lebanon 804,40 431,64 6,45 1,86 
Israel 1.490,75 972,08 155,70 1,53 
Algeria 338,17 227,89 46,25 1,48 
Syria 104,33 79,59 62,32 1,31 
Egypt 915,48 770,47 636,00 1,19 
Tunisia 239,67 265,03 154,81 0,90 
Source: author’s calculation based on WDI data. 
 
                                                 
1 Following the World Bank criteria, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia are included into the 
LMICs group. 
 
The evolution of remittances. 
 
Considering worker’s remittances and compensation of employees received by the 
Mediterranean countries -data coming from World Bank’s WDI-, we can get a mirror 
image obtained by the FDI flows. The time trends can be seen in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Remittances flows to North Africa and Middle East Mediterranean countries. 
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 Source: Author based on WDI data.  
 
As the figure shows, Egypt and Morocco are the biggest recipient of remittances among 
North African countries, followed by Algeria and Tunisia. Libya receives quite few 
remittances. The amounts increase sharply since 1990’s. Egypt’s peak point in 1992 is 
amazing, when 6.000 USD millions were exceeded. The median value of the 
remittances to Egypt is 3.235 USD millions.  
The Middle East region is dominated by the remittances flows to Turkey and Lebanon 
with a median value of 2.000 USD millions, approximately. In Israel, Syria and West 
Bank and Gaza remittances are less important, with a median value below 550 USD 
millions. Two additional facts can be highlighted in the Middle East region. On the one 
hand, in a breathtaking drop of 13.6%, the remittances received by Turkey fell from 
over 5.300 USD millions in 1998 to almost 730 USD in 2003. On the other hand, in 
Lebanon, remittances rose from 1.225 USD millions in 1998 to 5.592 USD millions in 
2004. 
These stylized facts, show that the volatility of the remittances may be substantial. The 
volatility values, measured by the coefficient of variation, can be seen in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Volatilities of remittances.  
Region / country Accumulated est dev mean median CV  Data period 
Lower middle income 815.504,20 24.891,98 22.652,89 11.772,65 1,10 1970-2005
Upper middle income 369.171,00 11.188,28 10.254,75 4.775,50 1,09 1970-2005
World 2.646.782,04 66.883,75 73.521,72 50.964,88 0,91 1970-2005
Middle East & North Africa 325.544,80 6.551,78 9.042,91 7.165,00 0,72 1970-2005
Algeria 25.913,00 555,17 719,81 432,00 0,77 1977-2005
Morocco 55.345,80 1.038,04 1.785,35 1.827,00 0,58 1975-2005
Tunisia 17.698,00 342,85 589,93 511,50 0,58 1970-2005
Egypt, Arab Rep. 96.633,00 1.067,52 3.332,17 3.235,00 0,32 1976-2005
Libya 59,00 2,79 9,83 9,50 0,28 2000-2005
Israel 17.680,00 355,39 491,11 423,50 0,72 1974-2005
Lebanon 38.434,00 1.422,25 2.402,13 1.955,50 0,59 1990-2005
Syrian Arab Republic 12.287,00 231,56 423,69 352,00 0,55 1970-2005
Turkey 74.844,00 1.203,58 2.338,88 2.046,00 0,51 1977-2005
West Bank and Gaza 7.122,00 218,58 593,50 541,50 0,37 1994-2005
Notes: Last column details the period with available data for each country or region. These differences 
must be considered when the results are interpreted. Regions and countries are ordered by the CVs values. 
North African countries are considered in the middle rows. Middle East countries are grouped in the last 
five rows. 
Source: Author based on WDI data. 
 
Some remarkable results are worth to be mentioned. Firstly, the two middle income 
groups have the same volatility, higher than the world and MENA values. Secondly, 
remittances to the ten Mediterranean countries are less volatile than the remittances to 
the whole world and the middle income groups. Thirdly, Algeria and Israel are the 
countries with the highest volatility among their groups (North Africa and Middle East, 
respectively). Their values are on line of the MENA value. Finally, the lowest values –
Libya, Egypt and the Palestinian territories- can be biased by the data period. 
 
Are those volatilities higher or lower than FDI or ODA flows? The question is answered 
in next section. 
 
Comparing the volatilities of FDI, remittances and ODA flows. 
 
Before comparing the volatilities among these three foreign finance sources, we can 
compare their relative importance looking at their levels. 
 
Table 12. FDI, remittances and ODA levels. 1970-2005.  
Region/country FDI Remittances ODA SUM GDPpc PPP 
World 10.448.849,39 2.646.782,04 1.586.568,70 14.682.200,13 8.477,15
UMICs 893.921,36 369.171,00 127.124,13 1.390.216,49 9.940,93
LMICs 1.284.695,26 815.504,20 502.562,95 2.602.762,41 5.730,94
MENA 84.717,05 325.544,80 211.658,20 621.920,05 5.449,96
Algeria 8.203,97 25.913,00 7.083,36 41.200,33 6.283,05
Morocco 7.993,28 55.345,80 19.057,87 82.396,95 4.052,36
Tunisia 9.541,20 17.698,00 8.221,29 35.460,49 7.447,44
Egypt, Arab Rep. 26.966,50 96.633,00 64.340,60 187.940,10 3.858,42
Libya   59,00 253,46 312,46 n.a.
Israel 34.994,70 17.680,00 25.265,04 77.939,74 23.010,33
Lebanon 15.107,26 38.434,00 5.797,23 59.338,49 4.968,04
Syrian Arab Republic 2.785,72 12.287,00 17.554,37 32.627,09 3.387,73
Turkey 29.860,00 74.844,00 12.047,75 116.751,75 7.479,66
West Bank and Gaza   7.122,00 9.744,79 16.866,79 n.a.
Notes: highest values in italics. FDI, remittances and ODA flows are measured in current USD (millions). 
GDPpc PPP in constant USD 2000 (units).  
Source: Author, based on WDI data. 
 
FDI is the most important foreign finance source for the world, middle income groups 
and Israel whereas for Syria and West Bank and Gaza are ODA flows. Remittances are 
the most important external flow in four out of five North African countries. The same 
applies to Lebanon and Turkey. The rank of the values is substantial and considerable 
differences can be detected among the countries.  
The three variables are positively correlated. The highest correlation coefficient is 
between remittances and ODA (0.70), whilst the coefficient between FDI and ODA is 
0.44, slightly lower than the correlation between FDI and remittances (0.45). 
The correlation between the sum of the three finance sources and the GDP per capita of 
the countries is negative (-0.5) but the powerful of the statistic relation is quite low 
(R2=0.0033). In economic words, although a country receives high volume of foreign 
finance, this will not imply that their citizens will be richer. It can be seen comparing 
Egypt to Turkey. Egypt has attracted 187.9 USD billions from abroad but her income 
per capita is only 3.858 USD, whereas Turkey has received 116.7 USD billions and her 
income per capita is 7.479 USD, almost double that Egypt’s. Reinforcing the argument, 
Israel has the highest income per capita but it only ranks fourth in the external finance 
order. 
Nevertheless, the constancy and predictability of the flows may be more important than 
their volume, if we consider that economic development is a long-term process. In order 
to know how volatile (non stable) these flows are, we can compare their coefficient of 
variation. The results are offered in Table 13. 
Table 13. A comparison of the volatilities of FDI, remittances and ODA. 
 CV Differences 
Region / countries  FDI Remittances ODA GDP ODA-Remit ODA-FDI Remit-FDI ODA-GDP
UMICs 1,24 1,09 0,75 0,52 -0,34 -0,49 -0,15 0,23
MENA 1,14 0,72 0,73 0,54 0,01 -0,41 -0,42 0,19
LMICs 1,19 1,10 0,60 0,68 -0,50 -0,59 -0,09 -0,08
World 1,27 0,91 0,56 0,62 -0,35 -0,71 -0,36 -0,06
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1,19 0,32 0,61 0,68 0,29 -0,58 -0,87 -0,07
Libya n.a. 0,28 0,60 0,38 0,32   0,22
Morocco 2,10 0,58 0,53 0,57 -0,05 -1,57 -1,52 -0,04
Algeria 1,48 0,77 0,42 0,50 -0,35 -1,06 -0,71 -0,08
Tunisia 0,90 0,58 0,38 0,62 -0,20 -0,52 -0,32 -0,24
Turkey 2,07 0,51 1,01 0,68 0,50 -1,06 -1,55 0,33
Syrian Arab Republic 1,31 0,55 0,93 0,47 0,38 -0,38 -0,76 0,46
Lebanon 1,86 0,59 0,67 0,54 0,08 -1,19 -1,27 0,13
Israel 1,53 0,72 0,62 0,77 -0,10 -0,91 -0,81 -0,15
West Bank and Gaza n.a. 0,37 0,50 0,13 0,13     0,37
Notes: lowest values in italics. Highest values in bold.  
Source: Author based on WDI data. 
 
Table 13 is divided into three horizontal panels and three vertical groups. As all the text 
above, the first panel is about regions values, the second panel contains the North 
African countries information and the third panel is for the Middle East countries. After 
the first column for the region or country names, there are 4 columns that contain the 
CV values of each variable. I have added the CVs of the GDP time series for each 
country-region for comparability purposes. The last four columns offer the volatility 
differences among the variables. Regions, North African and Middle East countries are 
ranked following the ODA volatility values. 
As the numbers in italics show, ODA is the lowest volatile finance source in all the 
regions considered (the world included). The same quality applies to Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Israel. On the contrary, the volatility of FDI’s flows is the highest without 
exception. 
ODA flows are less volatile than GDP in the world and LMICs, whilst higher in the 
case of MENA and UMICs. 
The volatilities of the GDP are higher than the world values in Egypt, Turkey and Israel. 
In the case of the two former (Egytp and Turkey), their FDI flows are highly volatile but 
their remittances are the most stable.  As for Israel, ODA flows have been the least 
volatile.  
Commenting on CV’s differences, as column 6 shows, ODA flows are quite less 
volatile than remittances in LMICs, UMICs group and the world, but ODA flows are as 
volatile as remittances in the MENA region. Algeria has the most stable ODA flows 
compared to remittances, and Turkey is just the opposite case.  
Column 7 shows how Morocco and Algeria in the North African region and Lebanon 
and Turkey in the Middle East are the countries whose differences between their ODA 
and FDI volatilities are higher. 
Column 8 shows how Turkey has the highest difference between FDI and remittances 
volatilities, and column 9 remarks the case of Syria whose GDP is much less volatile 
than her ODA flows. 
To summarize, ODA flows and remittances are indeed less volatile than FDI flows. But 
whereas remittances are stable and strategic to some Mediterranean countries (Egypt, 
Lebanon and Turkey), the ODA flows to some other (Syria and the Palestinian 
territories) are higher than remittances in volume but more volatile. Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia share the feature of receiving high levels of remittances but their ODA 
flows are more stable. Israel is the only case in which FDI is the highest finance source 
but ODA has been the least volatile. To put it in a nutshell, remittances is the main 
foreign finance source in the MENA region but the ODA flows has been the least 
volatile. It is not a main FDI destiny (Egypt and Turkey may be the exceptions) but the 
ODA flows to the region has been very steady.  
 
5. DOES AID OFFSET SHOCKS IN FDI AND REMITTANCES? 
 
Other relevant question is whether foreign aid has played a role that offsets shocks in 
FDI and remittances flows in the Mediterranean countries. We define a shock as a hard 
variation of the flows in the short run. Following some previous literature (Frot and 
Santiso 2008 and Arellano et al. 2009), we measure this effect computing the 5 year 
average of the finance variables (FDI, remittances and ODA). Afterwards, we calculate 
the gap between the annual figure and the 5-year average for FDI and Remittances. 
Finally, we obtain the correlation coefficient between the gap-FDI flows (and the gap-
Remittances flows) and the 5-year averages of ODA. The results are shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Correlation coefficients between shocks in FDI, remittances and ODA. 
 FDI-ODA REMITTANCES-ODA 
 Correlation coef. R2 Correlation coef. R2
MENA 0,511 0,2613 0,363 0,1317 
LMICs 0,649 0,4211 0,680 0,4630 
UMICs 0,536 0,2875 0,542 0,2935 
World 0,180 0,0324 0,656 0,4305 
Algeria 0,493 0,2432 0,083 0,0068 
Morocco 0,022 0,0005 -0,031 0,0009 
Tunisia 0,297 0,0882 0,356 0,1270 
Egypt -0,179 0,0319 -0,103 0,0106 
Israel -0,051 0,0026 0,380 0,1447 
Lebanon 0,438 0,1916 0,507 0,2571 
Syria -0,183 0,0333 -0,321 0,1028 
Turkey -0,093 0,0087 0,136 0,0184 
Source: Author based on World Bank’s WDI data. 
 
The main conclusion is that ODA does not offset the shocks, either shocks of FDI or 
remittances. All the R2 coefficients are quite low, being the highest the association 
between FDI shocks and ODA for LMICs, and remittances shocks and ODA in LMICs 
and World. But the correlation coefficient shows a positive sign for all the regions. This 
means that if the gap in FDI rises, ODA also rises and not fill the gap. There are seven 
cases with negative correlation coefficients. The economic interpretation of this fact is 
that when a country receives less FDI for five years, ODA rises for the same period 
trying to offset the FDI shock. This is the case of Egypt, Israel, Syria and Turkey who 
have negative signs in the association between FDI and ODA, but the determination 
indexes (R-Squared) are very close to zero. The same conclusion applies to the cases of 
Morocco, Egypt and Syria when the shocks in the remittances and ODA are analyzed.  
To put it in a nutshell, ODA has not been used as a flow that might offset the shocks of 
private financial flows such as FDI or remittances, in any of the Mediterranean 
countries.  
6. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
Widely speaking, the five Mediterranean countries located in the North Africa region 
have experienced high but volatile growth rates in the 60-70’s, whilst both rates were 
lower among 1980-2005. The Mediterranean Middle East countries have performed a 
more stable pattern, being Syria an exception. Excluding the Palestinian territories, all 
the sample countries have performed a higher growth rate than the world’s average and 
dramatic stagnations (Lebanon 1989, Algeria 1962, Libya 1981) and amazing 
accelerations can be detected. Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Syria have experienced 
considerable number of years with negative growth rates (20% or more for 1960-2005). 
In contrast, Egypt has never had negative growth rates. 
Growth rates are associated with poverty measures. Egypt, as the country with the best 
performance in terms of economic growth, shows the best performance in terms of 
poverty reduction: 23.76% for 1981-2005, and by 14.6% in the eighties. Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Turkey have also reduced their poverty, but in Algeria poverty has risen 
and in 2005 she had 2.5%.higher poverty than in 1981. Meantime, inequality has 
reduced a bit in Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey, but has risen in Egypt and Morocco. 
In terms of GNI per capita, Israel (almost 26.000 international $) double the following 
country (Libya) and is 6.5 times the lowest (Morocco). Israel, Libya, Turkey and 
Lebanon exceed the world average income per capita ($ 9.852) and the MENA average 
($ 7.384). 
Adding the ODA flows among 1960-2007, Egypt shows as the largest recipient country 
(more than 123 billion of USD, 34% of the whole stock) followed by Israel (55 billion 
that stands for 15%). The five countries located in the North of Africa account for 
almost 61% of the ODA stock. Libya accounts for only 0.5% of the whole sample’s 
stock. Its 1.8 billion dollars are only a 1.5% in comparison to Egypt’s stock. 
The ten Mediterranean countries account for 10% of the world’s ODA, whereas they 
accumulate 80% of the ODA to the MENA region. The five Mediterranean countries 
included in the LMICs classification account for one quarter of the ODA, whilst the 
three UMICs countries explain 15% of the ODA to this income-region. The highest 
amounts of ODA have been received in 1974-85 and 1990-92, when the figures were 
well above 10 billion of constant 2006 USD. The main difference between DAC-
donors’ commitments and disbursements (almost 40 billion for 1960-2007) happened in 
1990, when more than 15 billion USD were not disbursed. 
When we consider wide cross-country samples (regions or all developing countries), a 
positive correlation between shocks in GDP and ODA is found. But when we consider 
the Mediterranean economies individually the pro-cyclicality of the ODA is not 
confirmed, except in the case of Lebanon.   
FDI is the most important foreign finance source for the world, middle income groups 
and Israel whereas for Syria and West Bank and Gaza are ODA flows. Remittances are 
the most important external flow in four out of five North African countries. The same 
applies to Lebanon and Turkey. The rank of the values is substantial and considerable 
differences can be detected among the countries.  
The three variables are positively correlated. The highest correlation coefficient is 
between remittances and ODA (0.70), whilst the coefficient between FDI and ODA is 
0.44, slightly lower than the correlation between FDI and remittances (0.45). 
ODA flows and remittances are indeed less volatile than FDI flows. But whereas 
remittances are stable and strategic to some Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Lebanon 
and Turkey), the ODA flows to some other (Syria and the Palestinian territories) are 
higher than remittances in volume but more volatile. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
share the feature of receiving high levels of remittances but their ODA flows are more 
stable. Israel is the only case in which FDI is the highest finance source but ODA has 
been the least volatile. To put it in a nutshell, remittances are the main foreign finance 
source in the Mediterranean region but ODA flows has been the least volatile. The 
Mediterranean region is not a main FDI destiny (Egypt and Turkey may be the 
exceptions) but ODA flows have been very steady. Finally, we have shown how ODA 
does not offset the shocks, either shocks on FDI or remittances. 
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